program's destiny. Within these parameters, the case highlights some of the issues which allow for conjecture or second guessing.
At its conclusion, three important questions surface which bear relevant At their completion, BMO would Integrate the subsystems to provide the final weapon system. These four areas were:
BASING TEST AND SYSTEM SUPPORT CBT&SS)
-Systems engineering/analysis and basing integration testing.
-Integrate mlsslie and commercial railroad technology.
-Design and develop hardware, support equipment, and software to operate the main operating base (MOB-F.E. Warren AFB), garrisons, and rail garrison trains.
MISSILE LAUNCH CAR (MLC)
-Design and develop the Peacekeeper rail car launcher.
LAUNCH CONTROL SYSTEM (L=S)
-Design and develop launch control system and software.
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-Design and develop launch control and security rail cars.
-Design and develop train security and communication systems.
-Design and develop train electrical system. COST R,
AXCREPER MIUSILE
Across the board, BMO felt costs and schedule were the greatest risk areas.
They developed the estimated costs through employment of valid, Independent cost estimating techniques. The early IOC date mandated an accelerated development program and allowed little to no margin In the schedule.
Concurrency did not exist; however, it loomed on the horizon. Other significant risk areas included:
* Lack of fully defined requirements.
* System level test requirement uncertainties.
* Software developments and modifications.
* Main operating base (F.E. Warren AFB) facility construction.
Each of these risk areas were potential schedule and cost drivers and were a concern to the program office.
A final part of the acquisition strategy involved the inclusion of low rate initial production (LRIP) as part of the EMD effort. These LRIP articles wouid serve as the test assets for systems level and Initial operational testing, and validate the production tooling and manufacturing processes. Upon completion of the full EMD effort, BMO would compete production contracts for like articles.
BMO briefed this acquisition and businese strategy to HO Air Force Systems
Command (AFSC). HO AFSC approved these strategies and supported the ;'legatlon of the source selection authority (SSA) to the BMO Commander. At the completion of the source selection, the SSA would select the winning contractors.
No one raised an Issue with the fixed price contracts for the LCS and MLC efforts, although these contracts inherently contained higher risks due to hardware and software development and Integration. Nor did they raise concern over the program's "*reen light" schedule. program's functional baseline) and serve as the design requirements departure point for the PDRs and CDRs. Assuming a successful SDR and corresponding prrgram office authentication of the weapon system specification, BMO needed the PDRs and CDRs completed eight months and eighteen months post-SDR respectively. This would be a significant challenge, especially since 3110 developed the draft weapon system contract specification without a validated ORD.
Despite the challenges, BMO was optimistic It would get the job done.
They depended on their years of experience In ICBM acquisitions. Many of them had been more difficult. Besides, the contractor proposals helped convince B1O the program was "do-able.
CONTRACTOR INPUT
BMO expectea several bidders for each of the three development contracts.
As is true with typical weapon system acquisitions, ICBM programs maintained a corp of qualified development and production contractors. These included Boeing, Martin Marietta, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Westinghouse, GTE, and Rockwell International. To ensure they would have a legitimate competition, BMO issued a sources-sought synopsis which solicited interest from prospective bidders. They followed this with distribution of draft requests for proposal (RFP). By using this approach, they hoped to use industry comments to construct a better contract package. The ORD did not support the development of the weapon system specification or the program funding requirements. Because of this, the program office initiated this acquisition with a *rubber' technical and cost baseline.
The lack of solidified baselines presented this acquisition many unique problems, ones that go beyond the scope of this case study. However, these problems were attributable to undefined requirements. Additionally, in some instances where SAC specified requirements, designs proposed by the program office were not satisfactory. In many cases SAC had design solutions in mind from the outset. No PM has the perfect crystal ball to foresee all future problems. However, he can minimize the negative effects by thorough up-front planning. This case focuses attention on the impacts a less than optimized acquisition strategy can create.
TEACHING OBJECTIVE
The problem In this case is to determine the legitimacy of initiating this acquisition. Based upon tentative (draft) user requirements and a relatively short development timeline, was an executable acquisition strategy possible?
Two possible answers exist: yes or no. Therefore, under this premise, the principle objectives are to assess: He was In a no-win situation.
HOw IMPORTANT IS THE USER'S OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD)?
The ORD is the most important document In the acquisition process.
It is the foundation of the system specifications and contracts--It dictates the scope, direction, and ultimate success of the acquisition strategy. Knowing this, one can reasonably be assured that Industry will propose a 'bare bones" END effort, assuming they can recoup losses and extract profit from the subsequent production contract.
If the 'buy-in' looks too risky, the PH should not accept the offer under any condition. This real life Issue presents an Interesting ethical dilemma for both industry and the government.
